

SECRET

W.H. Subject

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Polygraph Examinations for Defense Contract Audit Agency Personnel

FROM:

Director of Security

NO

21 MAR 1985

TO: (building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. DDA
EX 7D-24 Headquarters

26 MAR 1985

Dick:

Attached is the history of polygraphing DCAA employees that are coningled with CIA projects, facilities and/or people.

I have no reason to believe that, now, DOD would react differently. Do you want to try again?

Atts

3 - 4 Let us just wait for a bit. DOD is considering initiating polygraph for the group on the own.

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Gov't Agencies

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Polygraph Examinations for Defense
Contract Audit Agency Personnel

FROM:

Director of Security
4E-60 Headquarters

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

18 JUL 1980

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

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OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

DDA
7D-18 Hqs.

21 JUL 1980

2.

3.

4.

DDCI
7E-12 Hqs.

22 JUL 1980

5.

6.

DO/PRM

23 JUL 1980

1/23

7.

C/PPG

7/29 7/29

8.

AC/OPS/PSI
DD/PSI

29 JUL 1980

7/29

9.

AC/CA

7/30

7/30

10.

~~AC/OPS/PSI~~

11.

12.

13.

Registry

14.

15.

OS REGISTRY
FILE See 11

- Retention

OS C 0000 3

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)		Polygraph Examinations for Defense Contract Audit Agency Personnel		
FROM: DDCI 7E-12, Hdqs.		EXTENSION	NO. ER-80-018/14	DATE
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)		DATE		
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. D/Security 4E-60, Hdqs.				
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The Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency

DD/A Registry
80-0514/13

Washington, D.C. 20505

22 JUL 1980

Admiral Daniel J. Murphy
Deputy Under Secretary (Policy Review)
Department of Defense
Room 2E12
The Pentagon
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Dan:

I have received your letter concerning our request to polygraph certain DCAA auditors who have access to our facilities. In view of the comments contained in your response, and considering the excellent working relationship between this Agency, the DCAA and the individual auditors assigned over the years, we will not pursue the matter further in this instance.

Aside from the specific issue of testing the DCAA auditors, I am concerned about the broader implications which seem to suggest that Agency standards should be applied only when there is no alternative and that the polygraph is pertinent solely within the strict confines of DoD Directive 5210.48.

I am convinced that an expanded and consistent application of the polygraph program throughout the Intelligence Community would pay significant dividends.

Sincerely,

/s/ Frank C. Carlucci

Frank C. Carlucci

OS 0-0980/3

SUBJECT: Letter to Admiral Daniel Murphy Regarding Polygraph
Examinations for Defense Contract Audit Agency Personnel

STAT

ORIGINATOR:



DATE: 18 JUL 1980

Director of ~~Security~~

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80-0514/12


18 JUL 80


Executive Registry


80-0514/14

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for Administration

FROM: 
Director of SecuritySUBJECT: Polygraph Examinations for Defense
Contract Audit Agency Personnel REFERENCE: Ltr from DoD to CIA dtd 2 July 1980
(ER 80-018/13)

1. The Department of Defense (DoD) position regarding polygraphing of Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) personnel was not a surprise to the Office of Security. My original reaction upon receipt of the Inspector General's recommendation that those DCAA auditors who commingle with CIA personnel and have access to Agency secrets be polygraphed was anticipation of strong DoD resistance. This supposition was based on the status of the auditors; they are not detailed to the Agency and the aforementioned access is required to perform DCAA functions. The nine individuals mentioned in the 30 May 1980 memorandum of the Deputy Director, DCAA who support a CIA-funded program, provide audit services as a courtesy. Our own auditors could take over responsibility for the Agency program, but only in the face of administrative difficulties that would work against the efficiency that features the present arrangement. 

2. Quite obviously, DCAA is adamant in refusal to permit polygraphing of its personnel -- to the degree dissociation from the Agency and its facilities is preferred. The arguments supporting the DCAA position were accepted by DoD and led to a denial of the requested waiver. Given the denial and the basis for it, it is not believed further dialogue with DoD would be productive. However, this position need not preclude action pertinent to a problem of much broader scope, i.e., expanded use and consistent application of the polygraph throughout the Intelligence Community. 

3. The DCAA response is a graphic illustration of the attitude of several elements within the Community toward

OS 0 0980/2

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the polygraph. DCAA presents a negative case that ignores the central issue of enhanced security provided by the polygraph vis-a-vis access to highly sensitive information. The DCAA response cites precedent and technicalities relating to the nature of association with the Agency in justifying a request for denial of a waiver. The general attitude seems to be that CIA standards should be applied only when there is no alternative and, with specific reference to the polygraph, only within the strict application of DoD Directive 5210.48, "The Conduct of Polygraph Examinations." As an example of this perceived approach, DCAA asserts that the procedures in effect to control the entrance and access by its personnel offset the need for the polygraph. This certainly represents a tenuous argument as well as a revealing insight into a philosophy that virtually relegates security to the status of a minor and annoying side issue. The same can be said regarding the "most important" problem of recruiting auditors. [redacted]

4. Such situations as outlined above underscore the desirability of pressing in general for expanded use of the polygraph throughout the Community. As Chairman of the DCI Security Committee I will encourage efforts along these lines. [redacted]

5. Insofar as the DCAA auditor situation is concerned, I recommend that the Agency accept the status quo. You may, of course, wish to consider terminating the access of the 16 auditors in question. However, I believe such action would not serve the immediate interests of the Agency, and within the context of addressing a larger problem would be counter-productive. [redacted]

6. Attached is a letter to Admiral Murphy for the signature of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, if he desires, which will complete action on the matter. [redacted]

Att
Reference
Letter to Admiral Murphy

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SUBJECT: Polygraph Examinations for Defense Contract
Audit Agency Personnel

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for Administration

FROM: [REDACTED]
Director of Security

SUBJECT: Polygraph Examinations for Defense
Contract Audit Agency Personnel [REDACTED]

1. Action Requested: That you sign the attached memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), requesting a waiver of the provisions of DoD Directive 5210.48, "The Conduct of Polygraph Examinations." [REDACTED]

2. Background: Recommendation A-4 of the IG Report on Industrial Contracting and Security called for, in part, the implementation of a program requiring that Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) personnel who commingle with Agency people and have access to Agency secrets meet the same standards for access approval as Agency staff employees, to specifically include the requirement for polygraph. We have identified those DCAA personnel by position who appear to meet the criteria suggested in the IG Report. However, we may not polygraph DCAA employees without the express approval of the Department of Defense. Hence, a waiver of the restrictive covenants of DoD Directive 5210.48, "The Conduct of Polygraph Examinations," is necessary. [REDACTED]

3. Recommendation: That the attached memorandum requesting the Department of Defense to waive the provisions of DoD Directive 5210.48 be signed. [REDACTED]

Attachment [REDACTED]

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SUBJECT: Polygraph Examinations for Defense
Contract Audit Agency Personnel

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OS/CD/I&CB jbb (15 Apr 80)
Rewritten: bb (28 Apr 80)
Rewritten: bt (1 May 80)

Washington, DC 20305

10 MAY 1980

The Honorable Fred P. Wacker
Assistant Secretary (Comptroller)
Department of Defense
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Mr. Wacker:

25X1 Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5210.48, Enclosure 1, limits Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) polygraphing of DoD civilian personnel to certain Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) employees assigned to a joint DIA/CIA activity as well as those individuals assigned or detailed to the CIA in activities where polygraph examination is required by the CIA. The Assistant Secretary of Defense, in a memorandum dated 19 December 1977 to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Communications Command Control and Intelligence), subject: Provisions of Department of Defense Directive 5210.48, "The Conduct of Polygraph Examinations," waived the restrictive provisions of said DoD Directive on the basis that certain DoD employees assigned to CIA contracting facilities and having staff-like access to those facilities and CIA information, fell within the intent of the above provisions of DoD Directive 5210.48, providing for polygraph examinations of DoD personnel assigned to CIA. It is our belief that 16 employees of the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) also meet identical criteria for a waiver of DoD Directive 5210.48.

25X1 At the present time, there are seven DCAA employees assigned to Detachment "A" who have staff-like access to CIA facilities. Three of these positions are located at a CIA facility in McLean, Virginia, and four positions are located

25X1 25X1 [redacted] All of these 16 employees have staff-like access to highly sensitive Agency programs and activities. [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] SECRET [redacted]

25X1
/ Accordingly, it is requested that a waiver of the provisions of Paragraph III, B.3, Department of Defense Directive 5210.48, be granted to allow polygraph examinations of the DCAA employees occupying those positions cited above.

Sincerely,

/s/ Frank C. Carlucci

Frank C. Carlucci

25X1
ORIGINATOR:

Director of Security

6 MAY 1980
Date

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